Algiers, 17 September 2026 (SPS) – The daily newspaper 'Le Jour d’Algérie" published an article in its Wednesday edition focusing on Morocco’s use of the Israeli spyware Pegasus, drawing in particular on statements by Mehdi Hajaoui, a former official with Morocco’s General Directorate for Studies and Documentation (DGED), as well as evidence uncovered by independent journalistic and technical investigations into the spyware.
The article reports that Hajaoui, who is said to have served as the number two official in Morocco’s foreign intelligence service, discussed in an interview with the French satirical newspaper "Le Canard enchaîné" the use of Pegasus to target journalists, activists and opponents, as well as foreign political figures, including African leaders.
According to the account of the former Moroccan intelligence official, Fouad Ali El Himma, a close adviser to King Mohammed VI, and Abdellatif Hammouchi, head of Morocco’s security and domestic intelligence services, were among the main supervisors of electronic surveillance operations. He also claims that technicians from the Israeli company NSO Group presented the Pegasus spyware to Hammouchi in Rabat in February 2017, before Morocco began using it on a large scale.
The article pays particular attention to Hajaoui’s statements concerning the alleged spying on African leaders during the African Union Extraordinary Summit in Kigali in March 2018. Confirmation of such activities would raise serious questions regarding the security and confidentiality of the deliberations of the continental organization, at a time when the Western Sahara issue and Morocco’s place within the African Union were among the main political matters on the agenda.
Hajaoui’s statements are placed within the context of previous investigations into Pegasus. The article recalls that "Forbidden Stories", in cooperation with several international media outlets and with the support of Amnesty International’s Security Lab, published new findings in July 2026 concerning the use of the spyware by Moroccan services.
It also refers to internal documents from NSO Group that allegedly identified Morocco as a client under the codename “Morgan”, as well as testimonies from former members of the Moroccan intelligence services concerning the use of Pegasus, notably by the General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance (DGST).
The article further recalls that the Pegasus Project, revealed in 2021, uncovered a database containing more than 50,000 telephone numbers selected as potential targets, including the numbers of 14 heads of state and government, as well as those of several African leaders and officials. According to the article, this illustrates the scale of the surveillance operations attributed to Morocco.
Among the information cited are the numbers of senior Algerian and Sahrawi officials, as well as those of activists and journalists, selected as potential targets and associated with Morocco’s account with NSO Group.
Telephone numbers belonging to senior French officials were also reportedly included in the database, as was that of South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, identified as a person of potential interest.
The article nevertheless points out, citing Amnesty International, that the presence of a telephone number in the database does not necessarily mean that the device in question was actually infected. A Pegasus compromise can only be established through a forensic analysis of the phone. The presence of a number nevertheless constitutes, according to the organization, an important indicator of potential targeting.
The Gabon Case
The article also devotes considerable attention to Gabon, presented as one of the best-documented African cases.
In March 2019, the telephone numbers of around ten influential Gabonese figures were allegedly added to the list of potential targets. They reportedly included Noureddin Bongo Valentin, the son of President Ali Bongo, and his former chief of staff, Brice Laccruche Alihanga, as well as several opposition figures, including Jean Ping and Didier Minlama Mintogo.
The article emphasizes that the list included both figures close to the authorities and opposition personalities, against the backdrop of a political crisis and a struggle for power in Gabon.
It also cites a former Moroccan intelligence official, using the pseudonym "Safir,” who reportedly said that Rabat regularly sent intelligence agents to Gabon, approximately 20 agents every six months, as part of close security cooperation.
Beyond Intelligence Gathering: A Strategy of Influence?
The article concludes that the information concerning Kigali and Gabon raises a broader question about the nature of Morocco’s use of surveillance technologies in Africa: was the purpose solely to gather intelligence, or were these tools part of a broader strategy of political and diplomatic influence?
Possessing confidential information about the communications of senior African officials could indeed have strategic significance on a continent where security, economic and energy interests, natural resources and geopolitical rivalries intersect, alongside the Western Sahara issue.
The article finally argues that the spying on African leaders during an official African Union summit should not be regarded as merely a bilateral matter. Such a practice would directly concern the security and confidentiality of the continental organization’s proceedings, as well as trust among its member states.
It therefore raises a fundamental question: Did the African Union actually investigate these allegations, or was the matter left without investigation? (SPS)
090/500/60 (SPS)
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